

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MICHAEL CRANE,

Plaintiff,

-against-

X-PARKER; X-NIXON; JOHN DOE LT.,

Defendants.

23-CV-1413 (LTS)

ORDER TO AMEND

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, brings this *pro se* action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights. Named as Defendants are “X-Parker,” “X-Nixon,”¹ and a John Doe lieutenant.² By order dated March 7, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed *in forma pauperis* (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees.³ For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

¹ The Court assumes Plaintiff uses “X’s” because he does not know these defendants’ first names.

² Plaintiff filed the complaint without an original signature. By order dated February 22, 2023, the Court directed Plaintiff to provide a signed copy of the signature page to the complaint. (ECF 4.) The Court received Plaintiff’s signature on March 3, 2023. (ECF 5.)

³ Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); *see Abbas v. Dixon*, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe *pro se* pleadings liberally, *Harris v. Mills*, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” *Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in *pro se* cases, *id.* at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, *pro se* pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. *Id.*

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants provided him with inadequate medical care and violated his rights with respect to a misbehavior report and

a related disciplinary hearing. The following allegations are taken from the complaint.⁴ Defendant Parker, who is an “assistant physician” assigned to Plaintiff as his primary care provider at Sing Sing, told Plaintiff that he was “suppose[d] to see a Neural Bone Specialist” with respect to his “shoulder and [b]ones.” (ECF 2, at 2.) However, “for unknown reason(s),” Plaintiff has not seen the specialist even though he has “continued [to] complain[]” to Parker. (*Id.*) Plaintiff complained through the facility grievance procedures, filed a complaint with the superintendent, and “finally [appealed] to Albany,” but all his complaints and grievances were denied. (*Id.*)

Plaintiff further alleges that Parker filed a “false misbehavior report” stating that Plaintiff threatened and harassed him. (*Id.*) Lieutenant John Doe conducted Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing during which he “relied on insufficient evidence.”⁵ (*Id.* at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that, without being provided a reason, he was prohibited from questioning Parker or hearing Parker’s testimony. Plaintiff was also unable to present documents or call witnesses who worked in the medical department. Plaintiff alleges that Doe relied solely on Parker’s misbehavior report and “failed to articulate institutional safety/or correctional goals sufficient to justify denying [P]laintiff(s) right to reply to the evidence.” (*Id.* at 4.)

Plaintiff further alleges that Captain Nixon “ignored the evidence presented in [Plaintiff’s] appeal.” (*Id.* at 3.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that (1) Nixon ignored evidence that the security officers working in the area did not hear Plaintiff making threats and they did not “endorse the misbehavior report,” (2) Nixon ignored the fact that Plaintiff denied the allegations

⁴ Because Plaintiff does not provide any dates in the complaint, the precise sequence of events is unclear.

⁵ Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing appears to be a result of Parker’s misbehavior report. Plaintiff does not state the outcome of the disciplinary hearing.

at the hearing; and (3) Plaintiff was not allowed to present “documentation proof” that Parker filed the complaint in retaliation for Plaintiff’s having filed complaints against Parker. (*Id.*)

Plaintiff seeks money damages.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting claims under Section 1983 that Defendants provided him with inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment, violated his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and filed a false misbehavior report against him in retaliation for his filing of grievances, in violation of his rights under the First Amendment. The Court addresses each claim in turn.

A. Inadequate Medical Care

To state an Eighth Amendment claim under Section 1983 based on inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must allege facts suggesting that correction officials were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious medical condition. *See Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). Deliberate indifference is evaluated under a two-pronged test comprised of both objective and subjective components. *See Hill v. Curcione*, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011). The objective component requires that a prisoner “show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose[d] an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.” *Darnell v. Pineiro*, 849 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The medical condition must be of such “urgency . . . that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” *Charles v. Orange*

Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2019); *see Harrison v. Barkley*, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the medical need must be a “sufficiently serious” condition that “could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

The subjective component requires a prisoner to show that the defendant officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” in depriving him of adequate medical treatment. *Nielsen v. Rabin*, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing *Salahuddin v. Goord*, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006)). That is, the prisoner must state facts showing that the correctional staff possessed “a state of mind that is the equivalent of criminal recklessness.” *Hathaway v. Coughlin*, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996); *see Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (holding that the subjective component requires that the plaintiff show that a medical professional “was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]” and that the officer drew the inference).

Where a medical professional inadvertently or negligently fails to provide adequate care, a prisoner cannot state a claim of a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment. *See Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 106. Thus, a “mere disagreement over the proper treatment” is not actionable. *Chance v. Armstrong*, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998); *see, e.g., Hill*, 657 F.3d at 123 (holding that medical officer who prescribed Motrin rather than stronger pain medication to treat a broken wrist did not have the “culpable state of mind” required to satisfy the subjective component of the deliberate indifference standard).

Here, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Parker because he does not appear to satisfy either component of such a claim. With respect to the objective component, Plaintiff alleges that he is over 65 years of age and that Parker said Plaintiff should see a “Neural

“Bone Specialist” with respect to his “shoulder and Bones.” (See ECF 2, at 2.) These allegations, without more, are insufficient to suggest a medical condition “that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” *Charles*, 925 F.3d at 86.

Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff did suffer from an objectively serious medical condition, he still fails to state a claim because he does not allege that Parker acted with the requisite intent. Plaintiff alleges that Parker recommended that Plaintiff should see a specialist, but “for unknown reason(s),” that never happened. Rather than suggesting deliberate indifference, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest, at most, negligence or a “mere disagreement over the proper treatment,” which cannot form the basis of a constitutional claim.⁶ *Chance*, 143 F.3d at 703; *see Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 106 (a negligent failure to provide adequate care does not amount to a constitutional violation); *see also Sonds v. St. Barnabas Hosp. Corr. Health Servs.*, 151 F. Supp. 2d 303, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that courts have repeatedly held that “disagreements over . . . forms of treatment, or the need for specialists . . . are not adequate grounds for a Section 1983 claim”). Plaintiff therefore fails to state a Section 1983 claim for inadequate medical care. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

In light of Plaintiff’s *pro se* status, the Court grants him 60 days to file an amended complaint alleging facts to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff must allege additional facts suggesting that his medical condition is objectively serious and that Parker was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

⁶ It is also unclear from the complaint that it was Parker’s responsibility to ensure that Plaintiff saw a specialist or that Parker was personally and directly involved in any decision preventing Plaintiff from seeing a specialist. *See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv.*, 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Disciplinary Hearing

The Court construes Plaintiff's allegation that his hearing was not conducted properly as asserting a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In such a claim, “a court must determine (1) whether a [liberty or] property interest is implicated, and if it is, (2) what process is due before the plaintiff may be deprived of that interest.” *Nnebe v. Daus*, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). For an individual who has been convicted, and already deprived of his liberty, his “liberty interest is implicated by prison discipline . . . only if the discipline ‘imposes [an] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” *Palmer v. Richards*, 364 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting *Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). “[R]estrictive confinements of less than 101 days do not generally raise a liberty interest warranting due process protection, and thus require proof of conditions more onerous than usual.” *Davis v. Barrett*, 576 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2009); *Kalwasinski v. Morse*, 201 F.3d 103, 107-08 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing factors relevant to deciding if confinement in segregated housing constitutes an atypical hardship).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts regarding any punishment imposed during his disciplinary hearing. Nor does he allege that he suffered an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” *Sandin*, 515 U.S. at 484, rising to the level of the deprivation of a liberty interest. Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted for a violation of the right to procedural due process. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint alleging additional facts to state a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

C. False Misbehavior Report and Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that Parker filed a false misbehavior report against him. Individuals who are incarcerated do not possess a “general constitutional right to be free from being falsely accused in a misbehavior report.” *Boddie v. Schnieder*, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997). If an individual who is incarcerated is “granted a hearing, and [is] afforded the opportunity to rebut the charges against him, the defendant’s filing of unfounded charges d[oes] not give rise to a per se constitutional violation actionable under section 1983.” *Freeman v. Rideout*, 808 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir. 1986). Allegations of false disciplinary charges therefore generally do not rise to the level of a constitutional claim unless a plaintiff shows something more, such as that the misbehavior report was filed in retaliation for the prisoner’s exercise of his constitutional rights. *See Boddie*, 105 F.3d at 862; *Freeman*, 808 F.2d at 951.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Parker filed a false misbehavior report against him in retaliation “due to the many complaint(s) filed against him.” (ECF 2, at 3.) Plaintiff’s claims may therefore be construed as attempting to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim. *See Franco v. Kelly*, 854 F.2d 584, 589 (2d Cir. 1988) (allegations that prison officials intentionally filed false disciplinary charges against prisoner in retaliation for participating in state administrative investigation implicate right to petition government for redress of grievances under the First and Fourteenth Amendments). “[I]ntentional obstruction of a prisoner’s right to seek redress of grievances is precisely the sort of oppression that . . . section 1983 [is] intended to remedy.” *Id.* at 589 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, alteration in original).

To state a First Amendment claim of retaliation, a prisoner must allege “(1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the [prisoner], and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action.” *Holland v. Goord*, 758 F.3d 215, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation and alteration

omitted). An adverse action is any “retaliatory conduct that would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights.” *Davis v. Goord*, 320 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). “In order to satisfy the causation requirement, allegations must be sufficient to support the inference that the speech played a substantial part in the adverse action.” *Davis*, 320 F.3d at 354. For example, “[a] plaintiff can establish a causal connection that suggests retaliation by showing that protected activity was close in time to the adverse action.” *Espinal v. Goord*, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2009); *see also Mateo v. Fischer*, 682 F.Supp.2d 423, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (endorsing incorporation of circumstantial evidence of causation “where the adverse action occurs soon after the protected activity,” and holding that, where a false misbehavior report was filed one day after he filed a grievance, causation requirement was met) (citation omitted).

Nevertheless, “because virtually any adverse action taken against a prisoner by a prison official—even those otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional violation—can be characterized as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act,” the Second Circuit has instructed that district courts must “approach prisoner retaliation claims with skepticism and particular care.” *Dolan v. Connolly*, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted); *see also Graham v. Henderson*, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Retaliation claims by prisoners are prone to abuse since prisoners can claim retaliation for every decision they dislike.” (quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, First Amendment retaliation claims must be “supported by specific and detailed factual allegations” and may not be stated “in wholly conclusory terms.” *Dolan*, 794 F.3d at 295 (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts to suggest a viable claim for retaliation. Even if the Court assumes that the complaints Plaintiff filed against Parker are protected under

the First Amendment, which they likely are,⁷ and that filing a false misbehavior report against Plaintiff is an adverse action, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts suggesting a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse action. Plaintiff does not, for example, allege facts suggesting that the adverse action followed close in time to the protected activity. *See Espinal*, 558 F.3d at 129. In fact, Plaintiff does not provide the dates of any of the operative events described in the complaint. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to state additional facts in support of this claim. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff should provide additional facts explaining the nature of the “many complaint(s)” he filed against Parker as well as the dates of any such complaints and the date on which Parker filed the allegedly false misbehavior report.

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. *See Hill v. Curcione*, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); *Salahuddin v. Cuomo*, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a *pro se* complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” *Cuoco v. Moritsugu*, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting *Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank*, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state valid Section 1983 claims for inadequate medical care and First Amendment retaliation, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.

⁷ It is well-settled that filing prison grievances is activity protected by the First Amendment. *See, e.g., Gill v. Pidlypchak*, 389 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 2004); *Davis*, 320 F.3d at 352-53.

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to provide more facts about his claims.

In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:

- a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
- b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
- c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
- d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.

Essentially, Plaintiff’s amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.

Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.

Plaintiff may consult the legal clinic in this District that assists people who are parties in civil cases and do not have lawyers. The Clinic is run by a private organization called the New York Legal Assistance Group; it is not part of, or run by, the Court (and, among other things, therefore cannot accept filings on behalf of the Court, which must still be made by any *pro se* party through the Pro Se Intake Unit).

To receive limited-scope assistance from the Clinic, Plaintiff may mail a signed retainer and intake papers to the NYLAG Pro Se Clinic at 100 Pearl Street, 19th floor, NY, NY 10004. Once the paperwork is received, the Clinic will coordinate contact with Plaintiff. Once received, it may take up to two weeks for the Clinic to contact Plaintiff. The Clinic's retainer form and intake paperwork are attached to this order.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an "Amended Complaint," and label the document with docket number 23-CV-1413 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore *in forma pauperis* status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. *Cf. Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 4, 2023
New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

(In the space above enter the full name(s) of the plaintiff(s).)

-against-

**AMENDED
COMPLAINT**

under the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1983

Jury Trial: Yes No
(check one)

— Civ. ()

(In the space above enter the full name(s) of the defendant(s). If you cannot fit the names of all of the defendants in the space provided, please write "see attached" in the space above and attach an additional sheet of paper with the full list of names. The names listed in the above caption must be identical to those contained in Part I. Addresses should not be included here.)

I. Parties in this complaint:

A. List your name, identification number, and the name and address of your current place of confinement. Do the same for any additional plaintiffs named. Attach additional sheets of paper as necessary.

Plaintiff's Name _____
ID# _____
Current Institution _____

B. List all defendants' names, positions, places of employment, and the address where each defendant may be served. Make sure that the defendant(s) listed below are identical to those contained in the above caption. Attach additional sheets of paper as necessary.

Defendant No. 1 Name _____ Shield # _____
Where Currently Employed _____
Address _____

Defendant No. 2 Name _____ Shield # _____
 Where Currently Employed _____
 Address _____

Defendant No. 3 Name _____ Shield # _____
 Where Currently Employed _____
 Address _____

Who did
what?

Defendant No. 4 Name _____ Shield # _____
 Where Currently Employed _____
 Address _____

Defendant No. 5 Name _____ Shield # _____
 Where Currently Employed _____
 Address _____

II. Statement of Claim:

State as briefly as possible the facts of your case. Describe how each of the defendants named in the caption of this complaint is involved in this action, along with the dates and locations of all relevant events. You may wish to include further details such as the names of other persons involved in the events giving rise to your claims. Do not cite any cases or statutes. If you intend to allege a number of related claims, number and set forth each claim in a separate paragraph. Attach additional sheets of paper as necessary.

A. In what institution did the events giving rise to your claim(s) occur?

B. Where in the institution did the events giving rise to your claim(s) occur?

C. What date and approximate time did the events giving rise to your claim(s) occur?

D. Facts: _____

What
happened
to you?

Was anyone else involved?

Who else
saw what
happened?

III. Injuries:

If you sustained injuries related to the events alleged above, describe them and state what medical treatment, if any, you required and received.

IV. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies:

The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Administrative remedies are also known as grievance procedures.

A. Did your claim(s) arise while you were confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility?

If YES, name the jail, prison, or other correctional facility where you were confined at the time of the events giving rise to your claim(s).

B. Does the jail, prison or other correctional facility where your claim(s) arose have a grievance procedure?

Yes No Do Not Know

C. Does the grievance procedure at the jail, prison or other correctional facility where your claim(s) arose cover some or all of your claim(s)?

Yes No Do Not Know

If YES, which claim(s)?

D. Did you file a grievance in the jail, prison, or other correctional facility where your claim(s) arose?

Yes No

If NO, did you file a grievance about the events described in this complaint at any other jail, prison, or other correctional facility?

Yes No

E. If you did file a grievance, about the events described in this complaint, where did you file the grievance?

1. Which claim(s) in this complaint did you grieve?

2. What was the result, if any?

3. What steps, if any, did you take to appeal that decision? Describe all efforts to appeal to the highest level of the grievance process.

F. If you did not file a grievance:

1. If there are any reasons why you did not file a grievance, state them here:

2. If you did not file a grievance but informed any officials of your claim, state who you informed, when and how, and their response, if any:

G. Please set forth any additional information that is relevant to the exhaustion of your administrative remedies.

Note: You may attach as exhibits to this complaint any documents related to the exhaustion of your administrative remedies.

V. Relief:

State what you want the Court to do for you (including the amount of monetary compensation, if any, that you are seeking and the basis for such amount). _____

VI. Previous lawsuits:

A. Have you filed other lawsuits in state or federal court dealing with the same facts involved in this action?

Yes _____ No _____

B. If your answer to A is YES, describe each lawsuit by answering questions 1 through 7 below. (If there is more than one lawsuit, describe the additional lawsuits on another sheet of paper, using the same format.)

1. Parties to the previous lawsuit:

Plaintiff _____
Defendants _____

2. Court (if federal court, name the district; if state court, name the county) _____

3. Docket or Index number _____

4. Name of Judge assigned to your case _____

3. Approximate date of filing lawsuit _____

6. Is the case still pending? Yes No
Is NO in the space in front of the following

7. What was the result of the case? (For example: Was the case dismissed? Was there judgment in your favor? Was the case appealed?)

Figure 1. The effect of the number of training samples on the performance of the proposed model.

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C. Have you filed other lawsuits in state or federal court otherwise relating to your imprisonment?

Yes _____ No _____

D. If your answer to C is YES, describe each lawsuit by answering questions 1 through 7 below. (If there is more than one lawsuit, describe the additional lawsuits on another piece of paper, using the same format.)

1. Parties to the previous lawsuit:

Plaintiff _____
Defendants _____

2 Court (if federal court, name the district; if state court, name the county)

3 Docket or Index number

4. Name of Judge assigned to your case _____

5. Approximate date of filing lawsuit _____

Rev. 01/2010

6. Is the case still pending? Yes No
If NO, give the approximate date of disposition _____

7. What was the result of the case? (For example: Was the case dismissed? Was there judgment in your favor? Was the case appealed?)

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signed this day of , 20 .

Signature of Plaintiff _____

Inmate Number _____

Institution Address _____

Note: All plaintiffs named in the caption of the complaint must date and sign the complaint and provide their inmate numbers and addresses.

I declare under penalty of perjury that on this day of , 20 , I am delivering this complaint to prison authorities to be mailed to the *Pro Se* Office of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

Signature of Plaintiff: _____



Since 1990, NYLAG has provided free civil legal services to New Yorkers who cannot afford private attorneys.

Free Legal Assistance for Self-Represented Incarcerated Civil Litigants in Federal District Court

The NYLAG Legal Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York is a free legal clinic staffed by attorneys, law students, and paralegals to assist those who are representing themselves or planning to represent themselves, including incarcerated litigants, in civil lawsuits in the Southern District of New York federal court, excluding habeas cases. The clinic is not part of or run by the court.

Even if a litigant has consulted with Clinic staff, unless they retain other counsel and that counsel enters a notice of appearance, they remain unrepresented; are responsible for doing whatever is necessary in connection with the case; and must still submit all court papers to the Pro Se Intake Unit, located in Room 105 of the Daniel Patrick Moynihan Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, New York, or by following the court's instructions for filing via email as a pro se litigant.

The Clinic Can:

- Assist with amending complaints and responding to motions to dismiss;
- Represent litigants for settlement purposes and, in limited circumstances, for depositions;
- Assist with written discovery;
- Recruit pro bono counsel for depositions and trial; and
- Assist with oppositions to summary judgment.

Clinic staff cannot assist with habeas cases or criminal matters.

NYLAG may also be unable to assist if it determines, in its professional legal judgement, that (i) you have refused to cooperate with the Clinic's counsel or follow the Clinic's advice; (ii) any assistance would be unreasonably difficult for NYLAG to carry out; or (iii) your case is or will become frivolous, unreasonable, groundless, or without merit.

Contacting the Clinic:

To contact the clinic and request a copy of our retainer, please call (212) 659-6190 and leave a message or write to us at the following address:

NYLAG Legal Clinic for Pro Se Litigants
Thurgood Marshall Federal Courthouse
Room LL22
40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007

Please mail a signed retainer back to the clinic at the above address. Once the paperwork is received, clinic staff will contact you. It may take up to two weeks.

Disclaimer: The information contained herein is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice or a substitute for legal counsel, nor does it constitute advertising or a solicitation.



New York

Legal Assistance Group

**LEGAL CLINIC FOR PRO SE LITIGANTS IN THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE RETAINER AGREEMENT

You retain the New York Legal Assistance Group (NYLAG) to provide you with limited scope legal assistance through its Legal Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York (Clinic) under the terms set forth below.

I. LIMITS OF ASSISTANCE

The Clinic agrees to provide only limited scope legal assistance in connection with your matter.

This means that:

- You remain a self-represented (pro se) litigant and are responsible for all aspects of your case. NYLAG is not your attorney of record in this matter. In the event that you are or become a party to a case in the Southern District of New York or any other forum, NYLAG will not enter an appearance or otherwise act on your behalf without expressly agreeing to do so and entering into a separate signed agreement with you. NYLAG has no obligation to enter into any such agreement.
- NYLAG has sole discretion to determine the specific type of services provided. These services may include providing advice and counsel about your case, explaining court orders and procedures, reviewing and commenting on your drafts, assisting with drafting, and discussing strategy.
- This retainer covers an initial consultation only. NYLAG can stop assisting you with this matter at any time for any reason consistent with the New York Rules of Professional Conduct.
- NYLAG has not agreed to represent or assist you on any other matter in the future. If NYLAG does agree to any representation on another matter, then a separate signed retainer agreement will be necessary.
- You may request but are not guaranteed subsequent appointments. NYLAG will only provide assistance on subsequent appointments if it provides you with confirmation to you of such assistance, via email or otherwise, with such additional assistance governed by the terms of this agreement, including that the assistance is for that consultation only and that NYLAG has sole discretion to decide whether it will provide any additional future consultations. You are responsible for and must meet all deadlines in your case, regardless of whether you are able to have an appointment with the Clinic.

II. FREE ASSISTANCE, NON-ATTORNEY PROVIDERS, AND COMPETENCY

NYLAG does not charge for this assistance. You may be assisted by law students and/or paralegals under the supervision of an attorney consistent with the Rules of Professional Responsibility. NYLAG's assistance does not guarantee success or any particular outcome but that NYLAG will provide competent assistance.

III. TERMINATION OF ASSISTANCE

Your participation is entirely voluntary, and you are free to stop receiving NYLAG's limited scope assistance at any time. NYLAG may stop providing limited assistance at its sole discretion consistent with the New York Rules of Professional Conduct. If NYLAG chooses to stop providing limited assistance, it will provide notice by email, mail, or phone.

IV. CONFIDENTIALITY

NYLAG will take all reasonable steps to maintain any information you provide as confidential.

V. REVIEW AND CONSENT

By signing and writing today's date below, you indicate that you: have read and understand this agreement; consent to the terms of this agreement; and understand the possible risks and benefits of proceeding with limited scope assistance.

If you have questions or concerns, please indicate on this form and someone will arrange to speak with you.

Signature

Date

Once you have completed this form, please mail it and the completed demographic form to the New York Legal Assistance Group, Pro Se Clinic, 40 Foley Square, LL22, New York, NY 10007.



Name _____

Date of Birth _____

Facility _____

Identification # _____

Email (if available) _____

How did you hear about our clinic? (Circle One)

Pro Se Intake Office	Order/Letter from the Judge	Conference/Hearing with the Judge
Pro Se Information Package	Website	Friend/Family
Other _____		

Ethnicity (Circle One)

Asian/Pacific Islander	Hispanic	Caucasian
African American	Middle Eastern	Decline to Answer
African	Caribbean	
Native American	South Asian	

Education Level (Circle One)

8 th Grade or Less	GED	2-4 years of College/Vocational School
Some high school	College graduate	Decline to Answer
High school graduate	Graduate degree	

Gender: _____

SDNY Case Number: _____

Once you have completed this form, please mail it and the completed retainer to the New York Legal Assistance Group, Pro Se Clinic, 40 Foley Square, LL22, New York, NY 10007.